Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has long been known to play an important role in decision making. However, the exact nature of that role has remained elusive. Here, we propose a unifying theory of OFC function. We hypothesize that OFC provides an abstraction of currently available information in the form of a labeling of the current task state, which is used for reinforcement learning (RL) elsewhere in the brain. This function is especially critical when task states include unobservable information, for instance, from working memory. We use this framework to explain classic findings in reversal learning, delayed alternation, extinction, and devaluation as well as more recent findings showing the effect of OFC lesions on the firing of dopaminergic neurons in ventral tegmental area (VTA) in rodents performing an RL task. In addition, we generate a number of testable experimental predictions that can distinguish our theory from other accounts of OFC function.
INTRODUCTION
Many studies have shown that orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is important for learning and decision making (see reviews by Murray et al., 2007; Wallis, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011) . Despite this progress, the exact role that the OFC plays in decision making is unclear. Even without an OFC, animals and humans can learn, unlearn, and even reverse previous associations, although they do so more slowly than their healthy counterparts. What role can the OFC be playing whose absence would cause such subtle, yet broadly permeating, deficits? We suggest that the OFC represents the animal's current location within an abstract cognitive map of the task (formally, the current state in a state space).
Our hypothesis links OFC function to the formal theory of reinforcement learning (RL). In recent years, RL has successfully accounted for a diverse set of findings from behavioral results in classical conditioning (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) to the firing patterns of midbrain dopaminergic neurons (Schultz et al., 1997) . At the heart of RL models is the concept of a ''state representation,'' an abstract representation of the task that describes its underlying structure, the different states of the task, and the (possibly action-dependent) links between them. RL provides a set of algorithms by which one can learn a value for each state, VðsÞ, that approximates the total discounted future reward that can be expected when the current state is s. These values aid decision making in the service of harvesting reward and avoiding punishments.
In most RL models, it is assumed de facto that the animal magically knows the true state representation of the task. However, it is clear that an integral part of learning a new task is learning to represent it correctly Niv, 2010, 2013; Wilson and Niv, 2011) . The state representation can be as simple as the two states needed to model a Pavlovian conditioning experiment in which a single stimulus predicts reward (e.g., the states ''light on'' and ''light off'') or as intractably huge as the state space of a game of chess. The states can be tied to external stimuli (as in light on/off), or they can include internal information that is not available in the environment and must be retained in memory or inferred, such as one's previous actions or the context of the task (e.g., information about the opponent's style of play in chess). More formally, one way to distinguish between simple and complex tasks relates to whether states are fully or partially observable to the animal given perceptual information. In fully observable decision problems, states correspond to easily detectable features of the environment, making these problems much simpler to solve than partially observable problems, which are notoriously difficult to solve optimally (Kaelbling et al., 1998) .
We hypothesize that OFC is critical for representing task states in such partially observable scenarios. We propose that OFC integrates multisensory perceptual input from cortical and subcortical areas, together with information about memories of previous stimuli, choices, and rewards, to determine the current state-an abstract label of a multitude of information akin to the current ''location'' in a ''cognitive map'' of the task. Importantly, although state representations most likely exist elsewhere in the brain as well, we hypothesize that the OFC is unique in its ability to disambiguate task states that are perceptually similar but conceptually different, for instance, by using information from working memory. Thus, impaired OFC function does not imply a complete loss of state information but rather that perceptually similar states can no longer be distinguished-an OFC-lesioned animal can still learn and perform basic tasks using RL, albeit using only observable (stimulus-bound) states based on current perceptual information. As a result, basic learning and decision making are possible without the OFC, but behavior becomes more and more impaired as tasks become abstract, and more of their states are partially observable.
RESULTS
Here, we show how our theory can account for a number of experimental findings. First, we consider the archetypal ''OFC task'' of reversal learning as well as delayed alternation, extinction, and devaluation before turning to neural findings that more directly reveal the contribution that the OFC might make to RL.
Reversal Learning
Perhaps the most classic behavioral deficit associated with OFC dysfunction is impaired reversal learning (Teitelbaum, 1964; Butter, 1969; Jones and Mishkin, 1972; Rolls et al., 1994; Dias et al., 1996; Meunier et al., 1997; McAlonan and Brown, 2003; Schoenbaum et al., 2002 Schoenbaum et al., , 2003a Chudasama and Robbins, 2003; Bohn et al., 2003; Izquierdo et al., 2004; Kim and Ragozzino, 2005) . We illustrate our theory through a simulation of Butter (1969) , although we stress that the model similarly accounts for reversal learning deficits in other animals and preparations.
In Butter (1969) , monkeys displaced a plaque on either their left or on their right in order to receive food reward. Only one location was rewarded in each block, and its identity was reversed once the monkey reached a criterion of 90% correct.
Reward contingencies were reversed five times. Figure 1A summarizes the results-whereas initial learning was spared, OFC-lesioned animals were impaired on reversals relative to sham-lesioned controls.
To model behavior in this task, we used a simple Q-learning algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Morris et al., 2004 ) that learns Qða; s t Þ, the value of taking action a in state s t . This q value is updated every time an action is taken and a (possibly zero) reward r t + 1 is observed according to
where a is a learning rate parameter and ½r t + 1 À Q old ða t ; s t Þ is the prediction error. We omit the value of the subsequent state from the prediction error (cf. Sutton and Barto, 1998) because, in this task, trials involve one state with no sequential contingencies. This renders our learning rule identical to Rescorla and Wagner (1972) . Using the learned values, the probability of taking action a in state s t is given by the softmax or Luce rule
where b is an inverse-temperature parameter that affects the tradeoff between exploiting and exploring, and the sum in the denominator is over all possible actions. Unless mentioned otherwise, in all simulations we used a = 0.03 and b = 3. Our model proposes that all animals learned with this same model-free algorithm, but that the crucial difference between sham-and OFC-lesioned animals was in the states, s t , about which they learned values. In particular, in concordance with the true structure of the task, for sham-lesioned animals, we modeled the task with two different states: state 1, in which choosing ''right'' yields reward and choosing ''left'' does not, and state 2, with the opposite reward contingencies ( Figure 1C) . In each state, the animal must learn values for the right and left actions. After an action is selected, the state transitions according to the chosen action and its outcome, and the next trial begins.
It is easy to see that such a state representation leads to rapid learning of reversals. When the reward is on the right, the model will be in state 1, and because a ''right'' choice from this state is most likely to be rewarded, the model develops a strong preference for the right action in this state. Similarly, after the reversal, the model transitions to state 2 and learns a strong preference for ''left'' from this state. Reversing back to the initial contingencies will not necessitate new learning, given that the action propensities learned in state 1 are left unaltered. If rewards and choices are deterministic, then the model will only take one trial to reverse its behavior after such a rereversal. In the face of decision noise, mistakes can occur at a rate determined by b.
The two states in the above model are defined by memory of the action and outcome of the last trial but are perceptually identical. Thus, according to our hypothesis, when the OFC is lesioned, these two states are no longer distinguishable, and the task reduces to one state ( Figure 1D ). As a result, the reversal of behavior after a reversal of reward contingency requires ''unlearning'' of the preference that was acquired in the previous block, and, although initial learning is similarly slow for both the intact and the lesioned models, the lesioned model takes much longer to learn subsequent reversals ( Figure 1B ). In general, the two states of our model of reversal learning can be seen as representing the two phases of the task (''reward more likely on left'' and ''reward more likely on right''). Thus, our representation generalizes to probabilistic reversal learning tasks (e.g., Tsuchida et al., 2010) in which the animal (and model) must infer what state it is in by using actions and outcomes from multiple previous trials .
Delayed Alternation
The same reasoning can be applied to model the effect of OFC lesions on delayed alternation tasks (Mishkin et al., 1969; Miller and Orbach, 1972; Butters et al., 1973; Mishkin and Manning, 1978) . In particular, we model Mishkin et al. (1969) . In this task, monkeys made a series of choices between two options, one of which was paired with a reward. The rewarding option on the current trial was determined by the action on the previous trial such that reward was always made available for the action opposite to that on the previous trial. Thus, the monkeys had to learn to alternate their responses, which, due to a 5 s delay between trials, required memory of the last action. Control animals learned this task easily, ultimately performing at around 90% correct. However, monkeys with OFC lesions failed to perform better than chance even after 2,000 trials of training ( Figure 2A) .
We modeled the behavior of control animals with the state representation in Figure 2C , in which the current state is determined by the choice on the last trial (option A or B). With this state representation, the model learns the task easily ( Figure 2B ), and performance is only limited by the degree of ''random'' responding mediated by the inverse-temperature parameter b. To model OFC-lesioned animals, we again removed states that require memory, resulting in only one (default) state. With this state representation, the model can never learn to solve an alternation task; hence, performance remained at 50% correct in the lesioned case.
A crucial result is that even OFC-lesioned animals could learn the alternation task if the delay was removed (Miller and Orbach, 1972) . Thus, the ability to learn about the value of alternation was unimpaired when a stimulus-bound two-state representation could be constructed but grossly impaired when a short delay required a memory-based state representation to be constructed. This suggests that value learning itself is unimpaired in OFC-lesioned animals and that the deficit lies in encoding of latent variables within the state representation.
Extinction
Our model also captures deficits in extinction that are caused by OFC lesions and makes a number of easily testable experimental predictions about postextinction phenomena (Bouton, 2004) . In extinction, a previously trained association between an outcome and a certain state or action is changed such that the outcome is no longer available. Theories suggest that extinction does not cause unlearning of the original association but rather results in learning of a new, competing association (Bouton, 2004; Redish et al., 2007) . Consequently, similar to the model of reversal learning, we modeled extinction with a twostate system (see also .
In particular, we consider the experiment in Butter et al. (1963) . Here, monkeys were trained to press a lever for food reward. After 30 min of reinforced pressing, an extinction phase began-rewards were no longer available, and the extinction of responding was measured as the number of presses in successive 10 min blocks. The results, shown in Figure 3A , clearly demonstrate slower extinction for OFC-lesioned animals.
As previously, we modeled control animals ( Figure 3C ) with a two-state model-the animal is in state ''P1'' if the previous lever press was rewarded and in ''P0'' if it was not. These states naturally distinguish the two contexts of reinforcement and extinction. We considered two possible actions-either the animal presses the lever (P) or it does not (N). In our simulation, pressing the lever led to 1 U of reward during conditioning and to -0.2 U in extinction (representing the cost of performing the action). Not pressing always yielded 0 reward. Again, OFClesioned animals were modeled as having an impoverished state representation that included only one memory-free state ( Figure 3D ).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3B . As in the experimental data, extinction in the two-state model was fast, given that extinction transitioned the animal into the P0 state, wherein new action values for P and N were learned (starting from low initial values). On the other hand, the one-state model of the OFC-lesioned animals could only learn to stop pressing the lever by changing the action value for P from a high value to a low one, which necessitated more trials.
As with reversal learning, in the case of probabilistic reinforcement, animals would need to integrate outcomes from multiple trials in order to infer which state or context (conditioning or extinction) they were in. For an exposition of how this kind of integration might be achieved, see . 
Postextinction Predictions
To assess the effectiveness of extinction and investigate what was learned during extinction, researchers often retest behavior after the extinction phase is completed. In particular, four classic effects-spontaneous recovery, reinstatement, rapid reacquisition, and renewal (Bouton, 2004 )-have been taken as evidence that extinction training does not normally lead to permanent modification of the original association.
Our two-state model also exhibits these effects because the original associations between stimulus and reward are maintained in the P1 state and can be recovered when this state is reactivated. However, our one-state model predicts different results for OFC-lesioned animals because there the original association is, in fact, erased during extinction. For example, consider spontaneous recovery. Here, conditioning (cue or action / outcome) and extinction (action / no outcome) are performed. Then, after days or even weeks, animals undergo a test phase in which no outcome is available, and the propensity to perform the action is measured. Animals typically show recovery of responding at test to response levels that are greater than those at the end of extinction, with more recovery for longer waiting times between extinction and test.
Our two-state model accounts for this behavior if we assume that the passage of time causes the animal to be unsure whether it is in P1 or P0 at the start of testing. If a state is selected at random (for instance, with probability proportional to the time since it last occurred), then, on average, animals will respond more in the testing phase than at the end of the extinction phase. In contrast, when the OFC is lesioned (that is, in the one-state model) extinction truly does extinguish the original association, and, thus, our model predicts no spontaneous recovery ( Figure 3E ).
The model's predictions are even starker for rapid reacquisition (Napier et al., 1992; Ricker and Bouton, 1996) , in which reconditioning of a stimulus / outcome association occurs more rapidly after extinction than in the original learning. The two-state model predicts this phenomenon, given that reconditioning will return the animal to the P1 state in which the old action preferences remain. However, we predict that OFClesioned animals will not show rapid reacquisition and may even show slightly slower reacquisition than original learning if there is a small cost associated with the response ( Figure 3F ).
Devaluation
The above tasks are predominantly explained with modelfree RL (Daw et al., 2005) . However, OFC is also thought to be important for model-based RL, in which animals use a learned model of reward contingencies to compute values. A prototypical example of such a model-based task is reinforcer devaluation (Colwill and Rescorla, 1985; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998) . In this paradigm ( Figure 4A ), animals are trained to perform actions or associate cues with an outcome. When the outcome is devalued outside the context of the experiment, for example, by pairing its consumption with indigestion-inducing poison, actions that were trained with the devalued food are reduced at test, even if the test is performed in extinction conditions (that is, with no additional experience of the contingency between these actions and the devalued outcome). Such behavior indicates a capacity to ''simulate'' the consequences of actions within a cognitive model of the task and, thus, realize that a once valuable action would now lead to an unwanted outcome and, hence, should no longer be chosen. These mental simulations (Daw et al., 2005) involve taking imaginary paths through the states of the task, and we propose that these imagined (but not externally available) states are encoded in OFC. Consistent with this proposal, OFC lesions impair performance in devaluation experiments, causing lesioned animals to respond equally to devalued and nondevalued cues Pickens et al., 2003; Izquierdo et al., 2004 ; but see Ostlund and Balleine, 2007) .
We illustrate this effect through the results of Pickens et al. (2003) , reproduced in Figure 4B . Here, rats were first taught Lever press rates were normalized to the maximum response rate in conditioning. Adapted from Butter et al. (1963 to associate a light cue with food. Subsequently, the food was devalued by pairing its consumption to the injection of lithium chloride. Then, a testing session measured the amount of time spent at the food cup when the light was presented. In order to establish a baseline level of responding, in a control condition, lithium chloride was administered in the second stage but was not paired with the food. Sham-lesioned animals showed reduced responding to the light in the paired condition relative to the unpaired condition, as if they were imagining the (never experienced) chain of events light / food / poison. OFClesioned animals showed no such change in behavior, as if they were incapable of such model-based reasoning. We modeled the behavior of sham-lesioned animals using the state representation shown in Figure 4C . We assumed that sham-lesioned animals used a mixture of model-based and model-free learning to compute values. The model-free (MF) component learned a value, V MF ðsÞ, for each state s using standard temporal-difference prediction error learning. Specifically, when the model transitioned from state s to state s', it computed a prediction error
which was used to update the model-free value of state s V MF ðsÞ)V MF ðsÞ + ad;
where a = 0.1 was the learning rate, and we assumed that the reward, r, was +1 during the initial learning phase and À1 after devaluation. Thus, the model-free component learns a positive value for the light state (given that it only ever experiences the light paired with food) and, in the devaluation stage, a negative value for the food state. In contrast, the model-based (MB) component uses the low value of the food state to update, even absent direct experience, the value of the light state through imagined simulation estimated (learned) probability of the light state leading to the food state (set to 0.9 in our simulations). The total value of the light was a combination of the model-based and modelfree values as in Daw et al. (2005) ,
where we used z = 0.2 as the mixing fraction. According to this model, when the food is devalued, sham-lesioned animals compute a low value for the light ( Figure 4D ). However, the OFC-lesioned model lacks model-based planning abilities (z = 0) and, thus, shows no effect of devaluation.
This line of reasoning can also be used to explain other recent findings that are thought to reflect the role of OFC in modelbased RL, such as sensory preconditioning (Jones et al., 2012) , identity unblocking (McDannald et al., 2011) , and Pavlovian overexpectation (Takahashi et al., 2009 ). In each case, OFC-dependent behavior or learning requires a form of mental simulation with the appropriate imagined (but not externally available) states.
Insights into the Role of OFC from Dopamine Firing Patterns
If the OFC is involved in RL, then, in addition to changes in behavior, lesions to the OFC should cause changes in the neural substrates of RL. Moreover, if our hypothesis is correct, then the changes in neural firing patterns should be consistent with the loss of non-stimulus-bound states but the preservation of all other RL processes. Motivated by this idea, in Takahashi et al. (2011) , we investigated the effects of unilateral OFC lesions on prediction error signals in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Schultz et al., 1997) .
In this experiment, described in detail in Takahashi et al. (2011) , after a light came on, rats initiated a trial by entering an odor port, where they were presented with one of three odors. One odor indicated that the left fluid well would be paying out a reward on this trial (henceforth, a forced left trial), a second odor indicated that the rat must go right to get a reward (forced right), and the third odor indicated that both wells were paying out (free choice).
Critically, the amount and delay of the reward offered at each fluid well changed every 60 trials as shown in Figure 5A . In the first block of trials, one well paid out one drop of juice after a short delay, whereas the other paid out one drop after a longer delay. In the second block, these reward contingencies were reversed. In the third block, the two wells offered a big reward (two drops of juice) and a small reward (one drop of juice), and these contingencies reversed again in the fourth and final block of the session. The experiment was repeated with similar sessions daily.
State Representations of the Task
We modeled both the rats' behavior and the firing of dopaminergic VTA neurons. The true generative state representation of the task (that is, the representation that accords with the experimenter-defined reward contingencies) is depicted in Figure 5B . A trial begins when the rat moves to the odor port (indicated by the ''odor port'' state). Then, an odor is presented, signaling a forced left (''left'' state), free choice (''free''), or forced right (''right'') trial. In forced right trials or free choice trials, if the rat chooses to go to the right fluid well, then it arrives at the ''right port'' state. Over time, the state changes to ''right reward 1,'' which denotes the time of juice delivery in blocks in which a small or short reward is delivered as well as the time of the first drop of juice if a big reward is to be delivered. The state continues to transition to ''right reward 2,'' the time of the second drop in big reward trials, ''wait right,'' a state that represents the unpredictable delay before reward on long reward trials, ''right reward 3,'' which is the reward delivery time in long reward trials, and finally the ''end'' state. In contrast, if the rat chooses to go to the left fluid well on a right trial, then the task transitions (without reward) to the end state, signifying the end of the trial. A similar sequence of states occurs for the left reward arc. Through repeated experience with the task, it is reasonable to assume that rats learned this correct representation of the task contingencies or at least the breakdown of the task into fairly well-delineated states. Thus, we assumed this representation when modeling the sham-lesioned group. Although a straightforward description of the task, some states in this sequence are not directly tied to fully observable stimuli. For instance, the ''right port'' state does not correspond directly to the physical right port, given that going to that same physical port on a forced left trial will not lead to this state. Moreover, we assume that the two physical food ports are relatively indistinguishable from the vantage point of a rat waiting for reward with its nose in the port. Of course, remembering the previous odor and action will uniquely identify the state. However, this is precisely the type of information that we hypothesized would be missing from the state representation if OFC function was compromised. We also assume that temporal information is not available externally, and, thus, OFC-lesioned rats cannot distinguish reward states that are only separated by the passage of time. Altogether, these assumptions define the OFC-lesioned state representation depicted in Figure 5C , which involves a single ''reward port'' state and two rather than four states in the reward arc (''reward 1'' representing the first drop of juice, and ''reward 2'' representing the second drop on big trials, externally distinguishable from reward 1 because it is immediately preceded by a drop of juice).
Prediction Errors
Our goal was to understand OFC-lesion-induced changes in prediction error signals recorded from dopaminergic neurons in the Neuron Orbitofrontal Cortex as a Map of Task Space VTA (Schultz et al., 1997) . These signals convey the difference between predicted and actual outcomes (Sutton and Barto, 1998 ; see the Supplemental Information for a detailed description) and, in theory, should depend strongly on how the task is parsed into states.
There are two points in a trial in which we can expect prediction errors-the time of reward (if the reward obtained is different from the expected reward) and the time of odor presentation (where prediction errors are due to the difference between the reward predicted after sampling the odor in comparison to the prediction before odor onset). Indeed, although behavior in both groups was equated because of the lesion being unilateral, Takahashi et al. (2011) observed small but clear differences between the firing of dopaminergic neurons on the side of the lesion in sham-and OFC-lesioned animals, the specific pattern of which was captured by our model. Here, we look more closely at these differences at the time of reward. Results at the time of the odor are presented in the Supplemental Information. Figure 6 shows the firing of VTA neurons at the time of unexpected reward. These rewards are unexpected at the start of a block, after reward contingencies have changed unexpectedly, but, given learning with the correct state representation, should be predicted by the end of the block. Thus, we compared the first two (early) trials to the last five (late) trials of a block in order to test for effects of learning (see the Supplemental Information for additional details).
Sham-lesioned animals ( Figure 6A ) showed a decrease in prediction error firing between early and late trials in all cases (p < 0.05). Importantly, there was no effect of transition type on the difference between early and late prediction errors. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the intact RL model ( Figure 6C ).
In contrast, in the OFC-lesioned animals, the difference in firing between early and late trials was wholly absent (p = 0.74) in the ''long'' to ''short'' transition at the beginning of the second block ( Figure 6B ). The lesioned model predicts the lack of elevated prediction errors at the beginning of this block. This is because the lesioned model cannot learn different predictions for reward on the left and right ports but, rather, learns to predict the average reward in the block. For the lesioned model, both blocks involve early reward on a seemingly random half of the trials and delayed reward on the other half. However, the model does predict positive prediction errors on block switches in which the average reward, over both options, increases. This can be seen in the data for the ''long'' to ''big'' transition from block two to three, both for the first drop (previously delayed on half the trials and now surprisingly reliably early) and the second drop (which did not appear before and now appears on half the trials).
The lesioned model also predicts no change in prediction errors for the ''small'' to ''big2'' transition at the beginning of the fourth block, a prediction seemingly not borne out in the data. However, in Takahashi 
of Unexpected Reward Early and Late in a Block
Unlike in Takahashi et al. (2011) , where neural responses were averaged over the different types of unexpected reward delivery, here we divided the data into the four different cases, indicated by the green annotations in Figure 5A : the short reward after the long to short transition between blocks 1 and 2 (long / short), the arrival of the first (long / big1) and second (long / big2) drops of reward after the long to big transition between blocks 2 and 3, and the second drop of the small to big transition between blocks 3 and 4 (small / big2). Early, first two trials; late, last five trials. some trials in the fourth block, an extra third drop of water was added to ''big'' trials if the rat appeared to be losing interest in the task. Although the timing of this manually applied third drop was not recorded, examination of the spike raster plots in which the response of individual neurons to each drop is clearly visible (for an example, see Figure S1 available online) shows the third drop in 13 of the 14 examples. Adding this third drop indeed changes the average available reward, aligning the lesioned model's predictions with the experimental results ( Figure 6E ). Therefore, a prediction of the model is that, without the third drop, this difference in firing between early and late trials for the ''small / big2'' transition would disappear.
Importantly, these neural results are inconsistent with prominent ideas according to which the OFC contributes to RL by directly encoding expected value. As detailed in Takahashi et al. (2011) , an inability to learn or represent values would predict that dopaminergic firing at the time of reward would not change throughout a block, because obtained rewards would be completely unpredictable-a prediction clearly inconsistent with the data. Observed differences in firing at the time of the odor are also inconsistent with this idea that OFC encodes value ( Figure S2) . Altogether, the behavioral and neural results suggest that, rather than representing values per se, the OFC is involved in representing unobservable states, which are often essential for learning or calculation of accurate values.
DISCUSSION
We have proposed a role for the OFC in encoding the current state in a cognitive map of task space and shown how this role would manifest in associative learning and decision making tasks known to depend on the OFC. Specifically, we have proposed that the OFC is necessary for disambiguating states that are not perceptually distinct. Our theory explains classic findings in reversal learning, delayed alternation, extinction, and devaluation, along with neural results from a recent lesion experiment (Takahashi et al., 2011) and makes easily testable experimental predictions about postextinction phenomena in animals with OFC lesions. Now, we turn to discuss the implications of our theory and relate it to other results and models of OFC function.
Neural Activity in OFC According to our theory, we ought to be able to see staterelated signals in the activity of OFC neurons. Thus, the question arises: what is the neural signature of a state representation for RL? We propose two conditions that should be satisfied by a brain region encoding states: (1) representation-all the variables that comprise the current state, as it is defined for the purpose of RL, are encoded in the brain area-and (2) specificity-irrelevant variables that are not part of the current state are not encoded in the area. The first condition ensures that all relevant variables are at least present in the area, whereas the second condition rules out areas whose encoding is not task specific. Our theory predicts that neural representations in the OFC would satisfy these two conditions across tasks and, specifically, that variables that are not necessarily perceptually available (such as memory for previous actions or outcomes) would be represented in the OFC, but only if they are required for the current task. Representation Although no experiments have explicitly tested these neural predictions, several results are consistent with the first condition-in particular, in tasks in which relevant variables are not externally available. For instance, our model implies that both the previous choice and the previous outcome should be encoded in OFC in reversal learning tasks, which has been found (Schoenbaum and Eichenbaum, 1995; Sul et al., 2010 ; the latter also found these variables in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [dlPFC] and anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]). In a probabilistic RL task, Hampton et al. (2006) showed that fMRI activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex close to OFC was correlated with the underlying task state in a Bayesian model.
A related experiment is the ''shift-stay'' paradigm (Tsujimoto et al., 2009 (Tsujimoto et al., , 2011 , in which monkeys choose between two options with a strategy cue, presented at the start of a trial, instructing them as to whether the rewarded response is to ''stay'' with their last choice or ''switch'' to the other option. Such a task is readily solved with two states that combine the last choice and strategy. Intriguingly, Tsujimoto et al. (2009 Tsujimoto et al. ( , 2011 found neural correlates of these variables in OFC.
Similarly, in delayed match-to-sample tasks, OFC encodes the remembered sample, a critical component of the state (Ramus and Eichenbaum, 2000; Lara et al., 2009 ; the latter study is especially interesting becasue it included ''distractor'' drops of water that did not elicit OFC firing), and, in fMRI studies, OFC activity has been associated with context-dependent disambiguation of navigational routes (Brown et al., 2010) and task rules (Nee and Brown, 2012) . Specificity Addressing the specificity condition is more difficult, due to it being hard to know exactly what state representation an animal is using in any given task. However, one could look for differences in OFC representations in tasks with similar stimuli but different underlying states. If OFC encodes the states of the task, even subtle changes in the task should lead to changes in OFC firing. This was indeed shown in two tasks by Schoenbaum and Eichenbaum (1995) and Ramus and Eichenbaum (2000) (reviewed in Schoenbaum et al., 2003b ). In the first task, four of eight odors predicted that a response at a nearby fluid well would be rewarded. In the second task, eight odors were used in the same apparatus, but reward on a given trial was not predicated on odor identity but, rather, on whether the odor on the current trial was different from that presented on the previous trial. In both cases, the odor was relevant for performance. However, in the first task, the identity of the odor was critical for predicting reward, whereas, in the latter task, whether or not the odors on consecutive trials matched was critical. Intriguingly, approximately 77% of OFC neurons were odor selective when odor identity was relevant, whereas only 15% of OFC neurons were odor selective in the task in which match, but not identity, predicted reward. Furthermore, in that latter task, 63% of OFC neurons encoded whether the odor was a match or a nonmatch. Simmons and Richmond (2008) also demonstrated that small changes in a task can cause significant changes to OFC representations. In their task, monkeys were rewarded after one, two, or three correct trials in a row, a number selected randomly after each reward. In a ''valid cue'' condition, background color indicated to the monkey the number of trials before the next reward, whereas, in a ''random cue'' condition, there was no relation between background color and number of trials to reward. As a result, the outcome of the previous trial was informative for reward prediction only in the random cue condition, because after a rewarded trial, the next trial would be rewarded only on one-third of the cases (a one-correct-trial requirement), whereas, after an unrewarded trial, the next trial would be rewarded on one-half of the cases (a two-correct-or a three-correct-trial requirement). Indeed, far fewer neurons encoded the last reward in the valid cue condition (25%), where it was not informative regarding task state, than in the random cue condition (50%). Furthermore, we predict that OFC encoding of background color should be different across the two conditions in this task.
Subdivisions of the OFC
The OFC is not a single, homogeneous region-connectivity analyses suggest a division into distinct medial and lateral networks in monkeys (Carmichael and Price, 1996) , humans (Croxson et al., 2005; Kahnt et al., 2012) , and rats (Price, 2007) . Recent results implicate medial OFC in encoding economic value and lateral OFC in more complex functions, such as credit assignment and model-based RL (Noonan et al., 2010; Murray, 2011a, 2011b; Noonan et al., 2012) . It seems likely that our theory pertains more to the lateral than the medial OFC, although the lesion studies we discussed typically targeted the entire OFC. Thus, more work is needed in order to precisely localize the representation of task states within OFC subregions.
Interspecies Differences in OFC
We have not distinguished between rats and monkeys, treating what is defined as ''OFC'' in these very different species as essentially the same area. However, it is important to note that there are large differences in anatomy across species, and OFC in rats has a very different cytoarchitecture than OFC in monkeys and humans (Wise, 2008; Wallis, 2012) . These stark anatomical differences have lead some researchers to question whether many of the frontal structures found in primates, including OFC, have analogs in the rat (Wise, 2008; but see Preuss, 1995) .
Interestingly, despite these differences, there are strong interspecies similarities at the level of connectivity (Carmichael and Price, 1996; Price, 2007) , neural activity, and function. This is particularly true for OFC, perhaps more so than any other prefrontal region (Preuss, 1995) . For example, lesions to OFC cause similar deficits in reversal learning (Teitelbaum, 1964; Butter, 1969; Jones and Mishkin, 1972; Rolls et al., 1994; Dias et al., 1996; Meunier et al., 1997; McAlonan and Brown, 2003; Schoenbaum et al., 2002 Schoenbaum et al., , 2003a Chudasama and Robbins, 2003; Bohn et al., 2003; Izquierdo et al., 2004; Kim and Ragozzino, 2005) , extinction (Butter, 1969; McEnaney and Butter 1969) , and devaluation Gottfried et al., 2003; Izquierdo et al., 2004) across species, and neural firing in different species in these tasks is also very similar (Thorpe et al., 1983; Schoenbaum and Eichenbaum 1995; Rolls, 1996a, 1996b; Schoenbaum et al., 1999; Gottfried et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2002; Morrison and Salzman, 2009) . We suggest that OFC encodes the current task state in all of these species. Animals such as rodents are perhaps limited in the complexity of the state that can be represented in their relatively small OFC, whereas humans, who have a much more developed OFC, are able to deal with highly complex tasks that involve many hidden states. Figure 7 illustrates how our theory of OFC fits into a larger model of RL in the brain. In particular, we propose that OFC encodes task states, drawing on both stimulus-bound (externally available) and memory-based (or internally inferred) information. These states provide scaffolding for model-free RL in a network involving ventral striatum (encoding state values VðsÞ) and dorsolateral striatum (encoding state-action values Qða; sÞ). This system is trained by prediction errors computed in VTA and substantia nigra pars compacta, where reward input from areas such as the lateral habenula, hypothalamus, and pedunculopontine nucleus is compared to predicted values from the ventral and dorsolateral striatum. State information in OFC is also critical for model-based RL (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al., 2005) , which makes use of learned relationships between The environment provides rewards and sensory stimuli to the brain. Rewards, represented in areas such as the lateral habenula (LH) and the pedunculopontine nucleus (PPTN) are used to compute prediction error signals in ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). Sensory stimuli are used to define the animal's state within the current task. The state representation might involve both a stimulus-bound (externally observable) component, which we propose is encoded in both OFC and sensory areas, and a hidden (unobservable) component, which we hypothesize is uniquely encoded in OFC. State representations are used as scaffolding for both model-free and -based RL. Model-free learning of state and action values occurs in ventral striatum (VS) and dorsolateral striatum (DLS), respectively, whereas model-based learning occurs in dorsomedial striatum (DMS) as well as VS.
Interaction with Other Brain Areas
states in order to plan a course of action through mental simulation of imagined states. In parallel, we propose that a purely stimulus-bound state representation encoded in sensory areas can also be used for learning and decision making. These stimulus-bound states are the sole basis for RL when OFC is lesioned but may also be used for learning in intact animals. For instance, concurrent use of a suboptimal stimulus-bound state representation could account for some erroneous credit assignment seen even in sham-lesioned control animals, as evidenced in Walton et al. (2010) .
Other Areas that Might Encode Task States Several other areas have been proposed to encode task states. Perhaps chief among these is the hippocampus. Like OFC, lesions in hippocampus cause deficits in spatial reversal learning (Teitelbaum, 1964) and prevent postextinction renewal (Ji and Maren, 2007) . However, this is true only when states are defined according to spatial location. Hippocampal lesions seem to have no effect on nonspatial reversal learning, whereas OFC lesions generally affect all types of reversal (Teitelbaum, 1964) .
On the basis of neural recordings that showed that choices, stimuli, and rewards were encoded in neurons in the dlPFC, Seo et al. (2007) proposed that dlPFC encodes task states. Indeed it seems clear that dlPFC satisfies the representation condition; however, this area is less able to satisfy the specificity condition, given that dlPFC seems to encode combinations of task relevant and task irrelevant stimuli. An intriguing possibility is that dlPFC encodes a reservoir of candidate state variables from which OFC constructs the current state with the variables found to be most relevant to the current task (Otto et al., 2009) .
There is also clearly related literature on rule-based behavior that does not explicitly mention state representations. Indeed, the outcome of learning with a sophisticated state representation is a set of action values that essentially determine rules for the task by specifying the most rewarding action in each state. Such rule-based behavior has long been thought to depend on dlPFC (Banich et al., 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000; Petrides, 2000) , and recent imaging studies have further localized this function to the inferior frontal sulcus and inferior frontal junction (Brass et al., 2008) . However, it is important to distinguish between a state, which is an abstract representation of the current location in a task, and a rule, which specifies a mapping from conditions to actions. These two functions may be associated with different brain areas, consistent with neuroimaging results in which tasks involving the implementation of explicit rules invoke dlPFC activity (Banich et al., 2000; MacDonald et al., 2000; Petrides, 2000) , whereas tasks requiring nontrivial assignment of reward in a complex state space elicit activations in the lateral OFC . Furthermore, Buckley et al. (2009) found differential effects of lesions to the OFC and the dlPFC in a monkey analog of the Wisconsin card sorting task-OFC lesions diminished monkeys' ability to learn new reward associations, consistent with an impaired representation of state, whereas dlPFC lesions decreased the ability to use a previously learned rule.
Finally, one might argue that the encoding of state information is too general a function to be ascribed to a single brain region and that these representations are widely distributed, perhaps over the entire prefrontal cortex. However, this seems at odds with the specificity of deficits that occur as a result of OFC lesions (Buckley et al., 2009 )-if the encoding of state were more distributed, then one might expect that lesions to other prefrontal areas would cause similar deficits. Furthermore, the OFC might be uniquely well placed to integrate disparate pieces of information, including sensory information and latent variables such as memories, in order to compute the current state because of its afferent connectivity, which is different from that of other prefrontal areas. For instance, the OFC is the only prefrontal area to receive sensory input from all sensory modalities; it has strong connections to areas such as dlPFC, ACC, and the hippocampus, and it has strong reciprocal connections with subcortical regions such as striatum and amygdala, which are critical to the representation of reward Price 1995a, 1995b; Murray et al., 2011) .
Relation to Other Theories of OFC Function
Over the years, many hypotheses of OFC function have been put forth. For example, that the OFC inhibits prepotent responses (Ferrier, 1876; Fuster, 1997) or that it represents bodily markers for affective state (Damasio, 1994) . Here, we discuss two popular recent accounts that also relate OFC function to RL.
OFC Encodes Economic Value
Perhaps the dominant theory of OFC function in the past few years has been the idea that OFC encodes economic value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006) . Interpreted in the language of RL, this essentially implies that OFC encodes state values, VðsÞ.
Recent studies have begun to cast doubt on this account. In particular, some patterns of firing in OFC neurons are hard to interpret as a pure value signal. For instance, OFC neurons have been found to encode variables such as spatial location (Roesch et al., 2006; Feierstein et al., 2006; Furuyashiki et al., 2008) , satiety (de Araujo et al., 2006) , uncertainty (Kepecs et al., 2008) , and taste (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008) . Indeed, our own results, specifically the preservation of VTA firing at the time of the odor after OFC lesions (Takahashi et al., 2011) , are inconsistent with the view that OFC provides values to the computation of prediction errors in dopamine neurons.
A more recent idea is that, rather than storing learned values, OFC computes values in a model-based way to enable flexible economic decision making and choices among many different options in many different situations without explicitly storing a previously learned value for each (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011) . This account fits well with our theory. In particular, although it is not yet clear whether OFC itself is involved in computing model-based values, we propose that the OFC provides the state information that allows these computations to occur and is thus essential to such economic decision making. OFC Takes Part in Solving the Credit Assignment Problem Our theory is closely related to a recent proposal that OFC (in particular, lateral OFC) acts to solve the credit assignment problem; i.e., to decide which reward should be attributed to which action for learning Noonan et al., 2012) . This idea shares many properties with our state-representation hypothesis, given that correctly keeping track of the current state allows credit to be assigned appropriately. However, in our theory, credit assignment itself is not damaged by the loss of the OFC, but, rather, the states to which credit is assigned are changed. This subtle distinction is an important one because it points to a key difference between the theories: our theory predicts that OFC lesions will not appear to cause a deficit in credit assignment in tasks in which stimulus-bound states suffice. Moreover, the credit-assignment hypothesis suggests that past actions should always be represented in OFC for credit assignment, whereas we predict that past actions will only be encoded when they are important for determining the states of the task.
More generally, our theory accounts for the role for OFC in a wide range of tasks, not only reversal learning, delayed alternation, and extinction, but also devaluation, sensory preconditioning, and so on. Indeed, it predicts involvement in any situation where task states are not stimulus bound. As such, our theory provides a unifying account of OFC function that can be tested (and disproved) in a variety of different tasks. 
